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Abstract
Financial crises are endogenized through corporate and interbank market
institutions. Financial crises can emanate from …nancial institutions which de-
termine the nature of equilibrium in the interbank market. Single-bank …nancing
leads to a pooling equilibrium whereby all illiquid banks are treated in the same
manner in the interbank market. With private information about one’s own
solvency, the best illiquid banks will not borrow but rather will liquidate some
premature assets. The withdrawals of the best banks from the interbank market
will generate negative externalities in the market. Consequently, the quality of
the interbank market will decline – which will make the more solvent but illiquid
banks withdraw from the market – and thus the quality of the market will be
further deteriorated and more banks will withdraw from the market, until the
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1interbank market collapses. However, multi-bank …nancing leads to a separat-
ing equilibrium whereby solvent and insolvent banks are distinguishable in the
interbank market. As a result, bank runs are limited to illiquid and insolvent
banks, and idiosyncratic shocks never trigger a bank run contagion.
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been documented that …nancial crises often accompany problems in …nancial
institutions, probably at some speci…c stages of development. The recent …nancial
crises in Japan and Korea, and the major …nancial crises in Europe and America in
the late 1920s and in earlier times, are some examples. This paper develops a theory
which endogenizes …nancial crises through institutions related to the corporate sector
and the interbank market. The basic idea is that di¤erent ways of …nancing corporate
investment projects may a¤ect the nature of bankruptcy in failing projects. This in
turn a¤ects information in the interbank market. For …nancial institutions unable
to commit to liquidate bad projects, there will be informational problems between
entrepreneurs and banks, which will cause informational problems among banks in
the interbank market. Severe information problems in the interbank market can lead
to a market failure, which creates conditions for a …nancial crisis.
In our model, an economy has many banks which receive deposits (à la Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983) and invest in long-term projects with stochastic returns. A techno-
logical shock can a¤ect a project’s returns and thus cause a bank to become insolvent.
A liquidity shock can make a bank illiquid. If in the interbank market lenders are
able to distinguish solvent and insolvent banks, i.e., there is a separating equilibrium,
when a solvent bank faces an excess of early withdrawals, it should be able to bor-
row. However, banks which are both illiquid and insolvent will not be able to borrow.
Therefore, bank runs are limited to illiquid and insolvent banks, and idiosyncratic
shocks will never lead to a bank run contagion in such an economy.
If lenders in the interbank market are unable to distinguish solvent and insolvent
banks, i.e., there is a pooling equilibrium, then all illiquid banks will be treated in
2the same manner. That is, all banks with a positive value of realized assets will be
asked to repay the same amount, which implies that the solvent banks will have to
subsidize the borrowing of the insolvent banks. With private information about one’s
own solvency, a better bank will face a higher cost of borrowing due to this implicit
subsidy. When the expected costs of borrowing for illiquid banks with the best
portfolios are higher than the costs of liquidating their premature assets, the banks
will choose not to borrow but rather to liquidate some of their premature assets.
The withdrawals of the best illiquid banks from the interbank market will generate
negative externalities: the average quality of borrowers in the interbank market will
be depressed. This may make the costs of borrowing for the remaining solvent banks
also higher than the costs of liquidating some of their premature assets. Thus, more
banks will withdraw from the market, and the quality of the interbank market will
deteriorate further. With a repetition of this process, we show that idiosyncratic
shocks can trigger a collapse of the interbank market.
However, a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market does not always lead to a
…nancial crisis even when there are idiosyncratic shocks. This is because the expected
borrowing cost for the best banks monotonically decreases with the homogeneity of
the projects’ quality, as measured by uncertainty. If the projects are very homoge-
neous in quality, the interbank market will always work well and there will be no
…nancial crisis. But when the projects are heterogeneous, a pooling equilibrium in
the interbank market becomes an incubator for …nancial crises.
This result has implications for the timing of a …nancial crisis in a pooling equi-
librium economy. The economy should have no trouble when most of its sectors
are similar, e.g., most projects are at similar imitation stages; but the situation will
change when the projects are more heterogeneous, such as when the imitation stage
of the economy has ended.
One of our major contributions to the literature is to model the function and
failure of the interbank market with the presence of both liquidity and technological
shocks and imperfect information. We introduce an interbank market with multi-
3banks, liquidity trading, and market imperfections into the Diamond-Dybvig model
(1983).1 We show that a certain type of …nancial institution makes information in the
market symmetric; in that case the likelihood of a bank run can be greatly reduced
(although not eliminated completely). A contagious bank run in our model is a result
of an interbank market failure, which is caused by another type …nancial institution
which generates an informational problem in the market. We extend the Akerlof’s
(1970) lemon problem from real markets to the liquidity market with informational
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the interbank market. Moreover, in our
model the informational problem in the market is endogenized.
Hayek (1945) outlined a principle according to which it is the market, rather than
the government, that provides the right information for the economy to operate e¢-
ciently. However, what this means in the context of a …nancial crisis is unclear. One
of our major contributions is to provide a model to illustrate that a commitment
mechanism to liquidate bad projects can make solvency information available to the
market on a timely basis.
With respect to the recent literature on banking, our work is complementary to
that of Diamond and Rajan (1999). Their focus is the incentive problem when there is
a limited commitment while the informational problem is assumed away. In contrast,
our focus is a contagious bank run when there is an interbank market failure.
With respect to the recent literature on …nancial crisis, Aghion, Bolton, and De-
watripont (1999) and Allen and Gale (2000) are closely related to our work in that
they also model …nancial contagion in a multi-bank model. But their emphases are
very di¤erent from ours. Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (1999) focus on system-
atic shocks to the entire banking system. In comparison, we focus on …nancial crisis
caused by idiosyncratic shocks. We study a mechanism of negative externalities in the
interbank market that transforms idiosyncratic shocks into bank failure contagion.
Allen and Gale (2000) derive …nancial contagion from the incompleteness of the
1See Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Rochet and Tirole (1996) for recent contributions on
modeling the interbank market with liquidity trading.
4structure of interregional claims. Similarly, we also derive …nancial crisis from the
shortcomings of banking institutions. If we reinterpret our interbank market as a
form of interconnectedness among all the banks in their model, then what we show is
that even with a complete structure of interregional claims, informational problems
in the market can still lead to …nancial contagion.
In our model, the pooling and separating equilibria in the interbank market are
endogenized through two types of …nancial institutions. A …nancial system where
key decisions on project re…nancing are made by ‘multi-agents’ is more likely to
liquidate bad projects ex-post. The reason is that the costs of renegotiation are
higher when there are ‘multi-agent decisions’; hence liquidations are more likely to
occur; that is, multi-bank …nancing can be used as a commitment device to create a
separating equilibrium. In contrast, …nancial systems where key decisions are made
by single agents do not face such high renegotiation costs and thus are more likely
to restructure rather than to liquidate; that is, the system is not able to commit to
stopping bad projects, thus good and bad projects are pooled together. Examples
of such ‘single-…nancier’ systems include the main-bank system in Japan and the
principal-transaction-bank system in Korea.
To focus on our major points, we analyze two types of a “pure” economy: 1) an
economy where every project is …nanced by one bank only – a pure pooling equilib-
rium economy; and 2) an economy where every project is co-…nanced by two banks – a
pure separating equilibrium economy. We also suppose that the choice of the …nancial
system in an economy depends on some exogenous reasons that make multi-…nancier
…nancing too costly, such as high costs to enforce contracts.
The idea about using multi-…nanciers as a commitment device is related to De-
watripont and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996). To focus on problems in the interbank market, in this paper we treat this
part as a reduced form with some explanations. This reduced form can be derived
from one of those contractual foundations, or from some other foundations, such as
Huang and Xu (1999).
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic
structure of the model and analyzes the relationship between …nancial institutions and
the two types of equilibria. Section 3 investigates how a bank run contagion is created
under a pooling equilibrium and when it may lead to a …nancial crisis; and it explores
what will happen under a separating equilibrium. Section 4 examines government
policy, in particular the central bank’s lender-of-last-resort policy. Section 5 discusses
other policy implications, including discussions on the Asian “miracle” vs. the Asian
…nancial crisis, the transparency of …nancial institutions and liberalization of the
…nancial sector, and corruption and …nancial crisis. The …nal section presents our
conclusions. The appendix contains the proofs of the lemmas.
2. THE MODEL
In our three-period model, an economy has M banks, N£M depositors, and many
entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur has an idea about a new investment project with
a stochastic outcome, but has no capital to …nance it. Banks are risk-neutral pro…t
maximizers that choose to invest liquidity in projects initiated by entrepreneurs.
All the M banks in the economy are ex-ante identical, and each N depositor de-
posits $1 in a bank. Thus, each bank’s asset is $N. The M banks form an interbank
market to trade liquidity. We assume that the liquidation of a bad project is observ-
able by all the banks.
There are two types of depositors – as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983): early
and late risk-averse consumers, with early consumers only consuming at t = 1, and
late consumers only consuming at t = 3. Ex ante, all depositors are identical and
not aware of their types until t = 1. They make their investment decisions on their
endowment of $1 based on an ex-ante belief about the riskiness of the banking system
and about the market equilibrium return on deposits.
In this economy, among all the projects proposed by the entrepreneurs, ¸ percent-
age of the projects are of a good type, and the rest are of a bad type. Ex ante,
6neither the entrepreneurs nor the banks know which projects are good and which
projects are bad, although they both are aware of the distribution. By working on a
project an entrepreneur will learn its type earlier than the bank(s). The way that a
project is …nanced determines the time that the entrepreneur’s private information
is revealed to the bank(s).
We suppose that a project takes three periods to …nish, requires a total investment
of I1 + I2 + I3, where I¿ is the required investment in period ¿, and I¿ À 1: The
technology of the project has a constant return to scale. A good project generates
an ex-ante pro…table return, Y > I1+I2+I3, while a bad project generates no return
as it stands. A bad project, however, can be reorganized at date 2; the best return a
reorganized bad project can generate is X, and I3 < X < I2+I3, that is, it is ex-ante
unpro…table but can be ex-post pro…table. The expected return from a project in
the pool is positive, that is, (1 ¡ ¸)X + ¸Y ¡ I1 ¡I2 ¡ I3 > 0:
Moreover, we assume that if a project is …nanced, at date 1 an entrepreneur will
learn its type, but the bank(s) still will not know it. At date 2, the bank(s) will
know the type of the project, and if it is a bad one, a decision will be made either to
liquidate or to reorganize.
We analyze two types of economies, each of which has a distinct …nancial institu-
tion: 1) an economy where every project is …nanced by one bank only; and 2) an
economy where every project is co-…nanced by two banks. We refer to the former as
a case of single-bank …nancing, and to the latter as a case of multi-bank co-…nancing.
Here, single-bank …nancing re‡ects real cases where …nancing decisions are made
by a single agent, such as the case of government-coordinated …nancing where the
government makes the …nancing decisions, or the case of the principal-bank system
where the principal bank makes the …nancing decisions (e.g., in South Korea) and, of
course, also true single-bank …nancing or internal …nancing. Multi-bank co-…nancing
re‡ects cases where there are diversi…ed and decentralized …nancial institutions and
a large number of agents are involved in investment decisions. We do not endogenize
the choice of a …nancial system in an economy. One of the plausible reasons for the
7choice of a …nancial system is exogenous costs, such as contract enforcement costs
which may discourage multi-…nancing. When the costs are high, a single-…nancier
system will be chosen.
2.1 Financial Institutions and Informational Problems
In this subsection we explain how …nancial institutions can cause informational
problems in an interbank market.2 We assume that an entrepreneur always prefers to
have his project completed regardless of its type; but when completion is not possible,
he prefers to quit the project as soon as possible. To express this assumption in a
formal way, we assume that an entrepreneur gets a private bene…t bt from working on
a project, where t denotes the date when the project is either completed or terminated
at t = 1;2;3. Speci…cally, if an entrepreneur quits the project at date 1, he gets a
low private bene…t, b1 > 0: If a bad project is liquidated at date 2, an entrepreneur
gets an even lower private bene…t b2b, where 0 · b2b < b1. At date 3, if a bad
project is reorganized and completed, it will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to
an entrepreneur; in the case of a good project, it will generate a private bene…t,
b3g > b3b, to an entrepreneur. To summarize, we have b3g > b3b > b1 > b2b ¸ 0.
With respect to …nancing, a project can be …nanced by one bank alone, or can be
co-…nanced by two (or more banks) jointly.
The timing of the game related to project …nancing is as follows:
² Date 0: All parties know the distribution of the projects and the depositors,
but no one knows the type of each project and the type of each depositor. The
bank(s) o¤er a take-it-or-leave-it contract to an entrepreneur. If the contract is
signed, the bank(s) will invest I1 units of money into the project during period
1.
2Those who are not particularly interested in the endogenization of informational problems, but
are keen to know how informational problems in the interbank market lead to …nancial crisis, can
omit most of this subsection and start from Lemma 1.
8² Date 1: The entrepreneur learns the type of the project. If the entrepreneur
stops the project (liquidation), he gets a private bene…t b1 > 0 and all the banks
observe the liquidation of the project. However, unless a project is stopped by
the entrepreneur the bank(s) still does (do) not know the type of the project and
further I2 units of money are invested. Moreover, the bank(s) will know the
distribution of their own project better than before as its private information,
i.e., ¸m, is more accurate than the prior ¸.
² Date 2: The type of a project becomes public knowledge:
– If a project is of a good type, a further I3 will be invested.
– If a project is of a bad type, a decision whether to liquidate or to reorganize
has to be made.
¤ If a project is liquidated the bank(s) get(s) zero and the entrepreneur
gets b2b < b1; otherwise,
¤ if a project is reorganized, I3 will be invested.
² Date 3: All projects are completed,
– for a good project, return Y goes to the bank(s), the entrepreneur gets
b3g > b3b;
– for a bad project, return X goes to the bank(s), the entrepreneur gets
b3b > b1.
If a project is a good one, it generates a high return Y no matter how it is …nanced.
For a bad project, we suppose that there are several strategies to reorganize it during
the third period, but only one of these strategies can generate X, which is ex post
pro…table. However this strategy can only be selected and implemented when all the
involved bank(s) is (are) in agreement.
Under single-bank …nancing, given that the earlier investments are sunk, the bank
will choose an ex-post e¢cient strategy to reorganize the project such that the payo¤
9is greater than the ex-post cost of re…nancing, I3. As a result, the bank is unable to
commit to terminating a bad project ex post.
Moreover, the fact that the bank is not able to commit to terminating a bad
project a¤ects the entrepreneur’s ex-ante incentives to reveal information. When the
entrepreneur at date 1 discovers that his project is a bad one, he anticipates that the
project will still be continued and re…nanced by the bank at date 2 as long as it lasts
until then. Consequently, if he decides to quit the project, he gets private bene…t b1;
if he decides to continue the project, the bad project will always be re…nanced by the
bank and will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to the entrepreneur. Therefore, the
entrepreneur will always choose to continue a bad project after he privately discovers
its type. This implies that in an economy where every project is …nanced by one
bank, the information to separate the good projects from the bad ones is available
neither to the …nancier nor to the interbank market at date 1.
However, in the case of multi-bank …nancing, the asymmetric information and con-
‡icts of interest among the co-…nanciers related to reorganizing the project incur a
cost, F for ex-post negotiations. When this cost, F, is high, the gain from reorgani-
zation is less than the total costs, i.e., X < I3 + F. Therefore reorganization is not
worthwhile and liquidation will follow.3
The commitment to liquidate a bad project at date 2 has a deterrent e¤ect on
entrepreneurs who have bad projects. Fearing further losses of his private bene…t
later, an entrepreneur will choose to quit a bad project as soon as he discovers it is
bad. Assuming the observability of liquidation, this result implies that if all projects
in an economy are …nanced by two banks, at date 1 information is available in the
interbank market to separate the good projects from the bad projects.
The following lemma summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1 At date 1, single-bank …nancing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the in-
3This is a reduced form of Huang and Xu (1999). It can also be derived from a variation of some
other models, such as Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996).
10terbank market such that good projects cannot be distinguished from bad projects;
multi-bank …nancing leads to a separating equilibrium in the interbank market such
that good projects can be distinguished from bad projects.
To simplify our language in the above lemma, in the reminder of the paper we call
an economy under multi-bank …nancing an economy with hard-budget constraints
(HBC); and an economy under single-bank …nancing an economy with soft-budget
constraints (SBC), a term coined by Kornai (1980).
2.2 Deposit Contracts
We consider a one-good economy. Each depositor’s $1 endowment can be stored
from one period to the next, without any cost, or it can be invested in a bank which
then invests in a project with stochastic technology, yielding a positive expected
return in the future as described in the above section.4
Each depositor’s preference is de…ned as
U = ¼1u(C1) + ½¼2u(C2);
where Cj is the consumption of type j depositor; j = 1 being early consumers who
consume at t = 1 and j = 2 being late consumers who consume at t = 3; ¼j is the
probability that a depositor is a type 1 or a type 2 consumer, and ¼1+¼2 = 1; ½ < 1 is
the discount factor and ½(R + 1) > 1; where R is the return from investment, which
is to be determined in later sections; and u
0
> 0, u
00
< 0, and (Cu
0
)
0
= u
0
+Cu
00
< 0.
At date 0, consumers make a deposit decision by solving5
max
C1
U = ¼1u(C1) +½¼2u(C2)
s.t. 1 = ¼1C1 + ¼2C2=(1 + R)
4To highlight our points, we temporarily abstract government away from the model. The role of
government will be incorporated into the model in a later section.
5Here, u(C2) is the expected utility, because unlike in the Diamond and Dybvig model, in our
model there is technological uncertainly.
11In general, the …rst order condition of this problem is
u
0
(C¤
1) = ½(1 + R)u
0
(C¤
2):
Given that u
0
+ Cu
00
< 0, ½ < 1 and ½(1 + R) > 1, we have
u
0
(1) > ½u
0
(1) > ½(1 + R)u
0
(R):
Consequently, an ex-ante optimal market equilibrium can only be achieved by in-
creasing C1 and decreasing C2, that is,
C¤
1 > 1;
C¤
2 < 1 +R:
As in Diamond and Dybvig, a market equilibrium, in which a bank implements de-
posit contracts with consumers, can Pareto dominate autarchy; that is for $1 deposit
at t = 0, a depositor receives either C¤
1 at t = 1, or C¤
2 at the end of the exercise.
The bank holds ¼1C¤
1 (as cash) at no extra cost, and invests the rest in an illiquid
project which yields a higher return. At equilibrium, an early consumer always wants
to consume at t = 1, but a late consumer has no incentive to withdraw early. This is
because when ½(1+R) > 1, the …rst order condition u
0
(C¤
1) = ½(1+R)u
0
(C¤
2) implies
C¤
1 < C¤
2. Thus for a late consumer a deviation does not pay as long as other late
consumers do not deviate.
However, as there is no perfect insurance against liquidity shocks, there may be a
bank run equilibrium, that is, a simultaneous deviation of all late consumers. With
the presence of an interbank market, the key for the existence of a bank run equilib-
rium is the possibility that the banks cannot solve their liquidity shortage problems
by borrowing from the market. Conditional on this, all late consumers will withdraw
at t = 1. This paper will focus on a mechanism whereby idiosyncratic shocks can
trigger a bank run.
In our multi-bank economy there are N depositors in each bank and the realized
numbers of type 1 and type 2 depositors in each bank are random draws from a
binomial distribution of ¼1 and ¼2 = 1 ¡ ¼1 respectively.
122.3 Timing of the Model
Combining the outcome of the banks’ investments in projects and the consumers’
deposit decisions, the evolved timing of the game can be summarized as follows:
² Date 0: Depositors make a savings decision; the banks make an investment
decision regarding how much and in which project to invest.
² Date 1: Early consumers withdraw their money from the banks; late consumers
make decisions about whether to withdraw or to keep their deposits in the
banks. A bank facing too many early withdrawals either has to borrow from
other banks, liquidate premature assets, or face a bank run. All bad projects
…nanced by multi-banks will be liquidated.
² Date 2: All single-bank …nanced bad projects will be reorganized by the banks.
² Date 3: All projects are completed; banks pay back the interbank loans if they
borrowed at date 1; and late consumers collect their rewards.
3. INTERBANK MARKET EQUILIBRIA AND FINANCIAL CRISES
3.1 Pooling Equilibrium in the Interbank Market and Financial Crisis
In an economy with single bank …nancing at equilibrium all projects will last for
three periods (an SBC economy), requiring a total investment of (I1+I2+I3), that is,
at date 1 banks are not able to distinguish between good and bad projects. Moreover,
each project’s expected rate of return is RS(¸) =
¸Y +(1¡¸)X
I1+I2+I3 ¡ 1 > 0: Thus, with an
endowment of N and anticipating the expected withdrawal at date 1, a bank’s optimal
investment decision is to hold N¼1C¤
1 in cash and invest N(1¡¼1C¤
1) in a project at
t = 0.6
6With an endowment of N and anticipating the expected withdrawal at date 1, a bank’s optimal
investment decision is to hold N¼1C
¤
1 + l
S in cash and invest N(1 ¡ ¼1C
¤
1) ¡ l
S in k
S projects at
13We suppose that at date 1 banks in an SBC economy have better information than
at date 0 because of their monitoring over one period of time, and this is their private
information. This private information is di¢cult to convey since all banks have an
incentive to falsely report if there is a bene…t of doing so. Moreover, we suppose that
the only public information in the interbank market is the average quality of all the
projects …nanced by all the banks in the market.
Formally, we suppose that at date 1 the manager of bank m (m = 1;:::;M) learns
privately that the probability of his project being good is ¸m. Moreover, the rank of
the qualities of all the banks’ projects is ¸1 < ¸2 < ¸3 < ::: < ¸M; and the average
quality is ¸ = 1
M
PM
m=1 ¸m.
If the total number of early withdrawals at date 1 is smaller than the expected
number ¼1N, a bank will have excess liquidity reserves to lend; if the total num-
ber of early withdrawals is more than ¼1N, however, the bank will face a liquidity
shortage; we call this bank illiquid. An illiquid bank may solve its liquidity problem
either by borrowing in the interbank market or by liquidating some of its investment
prematurely.
In the case of borrowing, an illiquid bank issues a bond in the interbank market.
With limited liability, a borrowing bank can only repay the bond if it has a good
project. However, given that the market knows only ¸; all illiquid banks will be
treated in the same way when they borrow. Therefore, all bonds issued by the banks
have the same structure: contingent on the realization of the project at date 3, the
t = 0, where l
S ¸ 0 is the amount of excess liquidity a bank puts aside ex ante, and
k
S =
N(1 ¡ ¼1C
¤
1) ¡ l
S
I1 + I2 + I3
:
Ex ante, each bank faces the same problem in planning its liquidity. The total supply of liquidity
at date 1 in the economy, for any given l
S, is M(N¼1C
¤
1 + l
S). The total expected demand for
liquidity in the economy is MN¼1C
¤
1. Thus, at equilibrium we must have l
S = 0; which makes the
number of projects to be invested by each bank, k
S; being independent from liquidity management.
Without a loss of generality, we assume k
S = 1.
14bond pays, 8
<
:
1; if the project is good,
0; otherwise.
To highlight our points, we assume that there is a Bertrand competition among
lenders such that these banks break even in lending. Hence, given the lenders’ belief
that the probability that a bank will pay back 1 is ¹ ¸; the equilibrium bond price is
pS = ¹ ¸.
For an illiquid bank to raise $1, it needs to issue 1
pS shares of a bond in the interbank
market. Thus, in order to deal with n excessive early withdrawal consumers for an
amount of nC¤
1, a total of
nC¤
1
pS shares of bonds should be issued. While the bond
structure is the same for all illiquid banks, with the private information about the
quality of each bank’s project, the borrowing cost for each bank is di¤erent. For
bank m, with a probability of being able to repay the bond as ¸m, the cost of raising
nC¤
1 dollars is ¸m
¸
nC¤
1
pS , that is, the marginal borrowing cost is CB (¸m) = ¸m
¸pS = ¸m
¸
2 .
Therefore, the higher the quality of a bank the higher the borrowing cost. Not
surprisingly, ¹ ¸ has to be relatively high to ¸m to make the expected pro…t of bank m
non negative.
Lemma 2 An illiquid bank’s expected pro…t will not be negative after borrowing if
the average quality of the projects is high, i.e., ¹ ¸
2 ¸
¸m(I1+I2+I3)
¸Y +(1¡¸)X :
In addition to borrowing, an illiquid bank can also liquidate part of its assets
prematurely to solve its liquidity problem. However, liquidating assets prematurely
is costly. We denote the exogenously given marginal cost of raising cash through
liquidating premature assets as CL.7 Given the cost CL, only the banks that have a
non-negative net return after liquidating some of their assets, i.e.,
E
¡ · R
¢
= [(1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ CLnC¤
1] ¡ I1 ¡ I2 ¡ I3 ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]C¤
2 ¸ 0;
7To keep the model simple, we treat the liquidiation cost as a reduced form. There is a large
literature on the costly liquidation of premature assets to solve a …nancier’s liquidity problem, e.g.,
see Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Diamond and Rajan (1999).
15view the option of liquidating some of their assets as desirable.
In general, at date 1 a solvent illiquid bank will compare CB with CL to decide
how to raise cash. When CB · CL then it will borrow; otherwise, it will liquidate
some of the premature assets.
We suppose that there are ¹ m banks facing liquidity shocks. In order to highlight
our points in a simple way, we assume that ¸m = ¸m¡1 + ¹ for all m = 1;2;:::; ¹ m;
and that CL is the same for every bank. Denoting ¹ ¸¹ m = (
P¹ m
i=1 ¸i)=¹ m, the following
Lemma provides a condition for the proof of a bank run contagion.
Lemma 3 With ¸m = ¸m¡1 + ¹, then CB (¸¹ m) = ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
·
¸ ¹ m¡1
¹ ¸
2
¹ m¡1
= CB (¸¹ m¡1); for
¹ m ¸ 2; and ¹ > 0.
Proposition 1 If CB (¸¹ m) = ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
> CL, then there may be a contagious bank run
equilibrium.
Proof. Let us look at a situation where ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
> CL >
¸ ¹ m¡1
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
>
¸ ¹ m¡2
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
::: > ¸1
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
, that
is, the cost for the best bank (with ¸¹ m) to issue bonds in the interbank market is
higher than the liquidation cost; but the borrowing costs for all other banks are
lower than the liquidation cost. Therefore, only the best illiquid bank will withdraw
from the interbank market. But the withdrawal of the best bank from the market
will lower the average quality of the borrowers in the interbank market such that
CB (¸¹ m¡1) =
¸ ¹ m¡1
b ¸
2 > ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸
2 = CB (¸¹ m), where b ¸ = 1
¹ m¡1
P¹ m¡1
m=1¸m; according to the
above Lemma. Thus, after the withdrawal of the best bank, the second best bank
will face CB (¸¹ m¡1) > CL and will withdraw from the interbank market. This will
cause a further drop in the bond price. Repeating the process, the bond market price
will decrease to a level whereby when the type-2 depositors observe this they will
infer that all borrowing banks are insolvent. Thus there will be a run on the banks.
This will lead to a contagious bank failure.
The ratio of ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸ ¹ m re‡ects how much a private evaluation of a project di¤ers from
a public evaluation, since ¸¹ m is private information of bank ¹ m while ¹ ¸¹ m is public
16information. It is also a measurement of the heterogeneity of the projects’ quality,
that is, the more heterogeneous the projects’ quality, the larger the di¤erence can be
between a private evaluation and a public evaluation. This proposition says that if
projects …nanced by the banks in an SBC economy have a high enough heterogeneity
such that the borrowing cost for the best illiquid bank is higher than the liquidation
cost, when there are many banks facing liquidity shocks, then a bank run contagion
may be an equilibrium. A basic intuition to explain the result is that the market
breaks down due to the asymmetric information generated by the SBCs. When the
quality of a good bank is private information and the bank is treated as an average
bank in the interbank market, it may …nd borrowing to be too costly and thus it
will withdraw from the market. But this will generate externalities such that the
average quality of the borrowers in the interbank market will decrease – which will
induce more banks to withdraw from the market until there is a total collapse of the
interbank market and a contagious bank run.
Proposition 2 If ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
· CL and ¹ ¸
2 ¸
¸m(I1+I2+I3)
¸Y +(1¡¸)X ; then at equilibrium illiquid banks
borrow in the interbank market and there is no contagious bank run in an SBC econ-
omy.
Proof. When ¹ ¸
2 ¸
¸m(I1+I2+I3)
¸Y +(1¡¸)X is satis…ed, the banks borrowing in the interbank
market will have a non-negative pro…t. Moreover, ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
· CL implies that the borrow-
ing cost for the best illiquid bank is below the liquidation cost. Thus, at equilibrium
the bank’s liquidity problem will be solved through borrowing. And all other illiquid
banks will do the same.
A low ratio of ¸ ¹ m
¹ ¸ ¹ m implies a low heterogeneity of the projects’ quality. The condition
of ¹ ¸
2 ¸
¸m(I1+I2+I3)
¸Y +(1¡¸)X means a high average quality of the projects. Speci…cally, it
expresses that the average probability that the projects will be successful is high,
and the expected return is high. This proposition says that if projects …nanced by
the banks are more homogenous, such that the borrowing cost for the best illiquid
bank (thus for all illiquid banks) is lower than the liquidation cost, and the average
17quality of the projects is high, then at equilibrium the problems of all illiquid banks
can be solved in the interbank market in an SBC economy. Thus, idiosyncratic shocks
do not cause a contagious bank run in an SBC economy. The intuition is that when
projects are more homogeneous, the asymmetric informational problem is reduced
(when projects are perfectly homogeneous, there will be no asymmetric informational
problem), thus the best illiquid bank will not face too high of a borrowing cost; with
high average quality projects, lenders can a¤ord to lend at more favorable terms to
all illiquid banks which reduces their borrowing costs.
These results have implications for the timing of a …nancial crisis in an SBC econ-
omy. When an economy is technically less developed such that most investment
projects are characterized by imitations, the uncertainty of projects is low and the
bank run contagion condition will not be satis…ed. When an SBC economy is more
developed such that a large proportion of investment projects consists of high-tech or
R&D-intensive projects which are more uncertain, the bank run contagion condition
is satis…ed.
3.2 Separating Equilibrium in the Interbank Market and Bank Runs
In an economy with multi-bank …nancing (an HBC economy), at equilibrium all
bad projects are stopped at date 1, and good projects will be completed.
To meet an expected number of early withdrawals a bank’s optimal investment
decision is to store cash in the amount of N¼1C¤
1 , and to invest all the rest — in the
amount of N(1¡¼1C¤
1) — into projects; each project is jointly invested with another
bank, which will generate an HBC mechanism that liquidates bad projects at date 1.
Without a loss of generality, we suppose that each bank invests in k projects and
invests (I1 + l)=2 in each project, where I1 is a new project’s initial investment; l is
the liquidity stored for each project; and k and l are to be determined endogenously
later. At t = 1; a bank can sell its extra liquidity in the interbank market when
uncertainties are realized; or a bank needs to borrow if it has more than expected
18good projects or it faces liquidity shocks. Thus, with an endowment of N, a bank
can invest up to N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1) in k real projects at t = 0, where
k =
2N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1)
I1 + l
:
Each bank optimally chooses l to maximize its expected returns. That is,
max
l
2N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1)
I1 + l
½
¸
·
Y ¡ I1 ¡ l ¡
(I2 + I3 ¡ l)
p
¸
+ (1 ¡ ¸)
µ
l
p
¡I1 ¡ l
¶¾
; (1)
where, p is the price for liquidity. Banks trade liquidities in the interbank market at
a price p for each share of bonds, where each share will be paid $1 at date 3.
From the …rst order condition of the above program and the market clearing con-
dition
¸(I2 + I3 ¡ l) = (1 ¡ ¸)l;
we have liquidity price,
p¤ =
I1 + ¸(I2 +I3)
¸Y
· 1;
and liquidity reserves for each project,
l¤ = ¸(I2 + I3):
At (l¤;p¤) the ex-ante (at date 0) expected rate of return of a project, RH, is,
RH =
1
I1 + l¤
½
¸
·
Y ¡ I1 ¡l¤ ¡
(I2 + I3 ¡ l¤)
p
¸
+ (1 ¡ ¸)
µ
l¤
p
¡ I1 ¡ l¤
¶¾
=
¸Y
I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)
¡ 1:
In an e¢cient interbank market, where there is no extra cost of trading liquidity, RH
should be the same as the rate of return in trading liquidity at price p¤,
1
p¤ ¡ 1 =
¸Y
I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)
¡ 1:
Thus, no bank has an incentive to deviate from (l¤;p¤): ex ante holding more than
l¤ liquidity for a later selling (at t = 1) in the interbank market will not generate a
better expected return; nor will holding less than l¤ liquidity and investing more in
projects generate a better return. The following Lemma records these results.
19Lemma 4 At equilibrium the liquidity price is p¤ =
I1+¸(I2+I3)
¸Y ; the amount of liq-
uidity reserves for each project is l¤ = ¸(I2 + I3); and the ex-ante expected rate of
return for each project is RH = ¸Y
I1+¸(I2+I3) ¡ 1:
In the event that a project is bad and aborted at date 1, liquidity 1
2l¤ is saved,
which the bank may sell in the interbank market to earn a higher return. If a project
is good and to be continued at date 1, it will need 1
2(I2 +I3 ¡l¤) further liquidity to
be completed. When a bank faces j good projects and k¡j bad projects, its balance
of liquidity is,
1
2
(k ¡ j)l¤ ¡
1
2
j(I2 + I3 ¡ l¤) =
1
2
(k¸ ¡ j)(I2 + I3):
Obviously, without a liquidity shock a bank is a net liquidity provider to the interbank
market if it has more bad projects, i.e. k¸ > j, than the average in the banking
system. Otherwise, it is a net liquidity borrower.
When there are excessive early withdrawals, i.e., the number of early withdrawals
is greater than N¼1C¤
1, given that the demand deposit contract requires that C¤
1 > 1
and C¤
2 < 1 + RH, which implies that
C¤
2
C¤
1
< 1 + RH =
1
p¤;
it costs the bank
C¤
1
p¤ ¡ C¤
2 = C¤
1
µ
1
p¤ ¡
C¤
2
C¤
1
¶
;
at t = 1 to …nance each excess early withdrawal. The expected return rate of a bank
at date 1 when there are j good projects and n excess early withdrawals is
RH
1 =
1
1
2k[I1 + ¸(I2 +I3)]
µ
1
2
jY ¡
(j ¡ k¸)(I2 + I3)
2p¤ ¡ nC¤
1
µ
1
p¤ ¡
C¤
2
C¤
1
¶¶
¡ 1
=
1
p¤ (j (Y p¤ ¡ (I2 + I3)) + k¸(I2 + I3)) ¡ 2nC¤
1
³
1
p¤ ¡
C¤
2
C¤
1
´
k[I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)]
¡ 1:
A negative excess early withdrawal number, i.e., n < 0; represents less than the
expected early withdrawals, which implies an extra liquidity provision. It is intuitive
20and straightforward to see that RH
1 increases with the number of good projects, j,
and decreases with the number of excess early withdrawals, n.
To highlight our points, we restrict our interests to cases where the total number of
depositors in each bank, N, is large, the quality of projects, ¸, is not too low, and the
proportion of early type consumers, ¼1, is not so large that 2¸2N(1¡¼1C¤
1) ¸ 1; and
¼1C¤
1 is di¤erent enough from 1 such that
¸Y ¡I1¡¸(I2+I3)
¸Y C¤
1¡C¤
2(I1+¸(I2+I3)) ¸
(1¡¼1)
(1¡¼1C¤
1).8 Then
we have the following results.9
Lemma 5 In an HBC economy,
1. When the realized quality of a bank’s projects is not worse than the average level
(e.g., j ¸ k¸), the bank is always solvent regardless of the presence of liquidity
shocks.
2. When there are no excess early withdrawals (e.g., n · 0) a bank is always
solvent regardless of the presence of technological shocks.
The …rst result says that when a bank’s projects are not worse than average, the
present value of the projects’ returns will be enough to cover the cost of borrowing to
deal with excessive early withdrawals even in a case where all depositors withdraw at
date 1. Therefore, given symmetric information about the quality of a bank assets in
the market, this bank will be able to borrow at the market rate to solve its liquidity
problem. The second result says that when there are no excess early withdrawals,
even in the worst case where a bank has no single realized good project, the return
from selling liquidity at the market rate will keep the bank solvent.
The above results are based on the existence of an e¢cient interbank market which
redistributes liquidities among banks according to the ex-post realized shocks. The
e¢ciency of an interbank market is the result of an HBC mechanism in the banking
sector that generates symmetric information among banks.
8Given p
¤ =
I1+¸(I2+I3)
¸Y < 1 and
C¤
2
C¤
1
<
1
p¤, ¸Y C
¤
1 ¡ C
¤
2 (I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)) > 0:
9The above restrictions are only for presentation purposes. Relaxing them will not alter the
results qualitatively but make the presentation messier.
21Lemma 6 A bank becomes insolvent when it has no good projects and too many
excess early withdrawals such that n ¸
I(Y (I2+I3)¡I2)
2(Y C¤
1¡C¤
2I) , where I = I1 + I2 + I3.
Under a separating equilibrium solvency is public information in the interbank
market; an insolvent bank will not be able to borrow in the market and thus faces
a bank run. In general, given RH
1 decreases in n and increases in j, banks with a
large enough n and small enough j will be unable to solve the liquidity shortage
problem in the interbank market and thus will be subject to bank runs. However,
due to the symmetric information in the interbank market, their bank runs do not
have externalities, i.e. they will not a¤ect the borrowing of the solvent banks in the
market. Thus, bank runs are not avoidable but they are contained. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 In an HBC economy a bank run occurs only in banks that face both
severe technological shocks and liquidity shocks, but a contagious bank run in the
banking system does not occur.
An HBC mechanism generates symmetric information among banks. With the
symmetric information the interbank market should be able to provide liquidity to
all illiquid banks that are not hit too badly by technological shocks. As a result,
although a bank run cannot be completely avoided, a bank run contagion does not
occur in an HBC economy. In sharp contrast, in an SBC economy where information
about the quality of bank investments is private to each bank alone, the interbank
market is a lemon market. As a result, a bank run can be avoided completely when
the projects are homogeneous; or there can be a bank run contagion equilibrium when
the projects are heterogeneous and there are liquidity shocks.
4. LENDER OF LAST RESORT AND BAIL-OUT TRAP
When there is an interbank market failure and costly early liquidation of prema-
ture assets, it may be desirable for the government to do something to stabilize the
22interbank market and to stop a bank run contagion. However, the problem in an SBC
economy is that the government also faces an adverse selection problem.
In this section, we examine government policies from the perspective that these
policies should minimize social welfare losses, de…ned as the sum of the costs of
bank runs and policy implementation. We show that in an SBC economy, without
reforming the …nancial institution, the best that the government can do is to rescue
all the banks regardless of their quality, but this creates more commitment and moral
hazard problems in the banking system.
In the economy, the government’s role is to be the lender of the last resort (LOLR)
by providing liquidity to illiquid banks.10 The government, however, also faces
an informational problem in that, like the interbank market, it only has imperfect
information about the solvency of each bank and it is not able to distinguish good
banks from bad banks, particularly during periods of crisis.11 In reality, many central
bankers indeed express their frustrations in trying to identify the solvency of illiquid
banks. Unlike the interbank market, however, the government (or central bank) can
deal with a market failure problem more e¤ectively by providing a large amount of
liquidity within a short time.
Focusing on the informational problem faced by the government and noting that
the only asset an illiquid bank has is its investment in a risky project, we model LOLR
loans as the government selling bonds to illiquid banks, with the banks’ investments
in the risky projects as (implicit) collateral. We suppose that the government’s
perception that the probability that an average illiquid bank will be able to repay is
¸G, the government will sell the bond at a price of pG to the illiquid bank, and the
10Goodhart and Huang (1998) and Freixas (1999) are among the …rst models of the lender of last
resort. But these models do not deal with moral hazard problems as consequences of bailing out
banks, e.g., the SBC problem.
11We make this extreme assumption to highlight our points. Our model’s qualitative results will
still hold if we allow the government to have better, but not perfect, information than the market
about the quality of the banks.
23bank repays the bond at date 3 contingent on the realization of the project,
8
<
:
1; if the project is good,
0; otherwise.
Given the government’s perception of the probability that an average bank can pay
back is ¸G; bond price pS = ¸G may allow the government to break even.12
By setting bond price pG the government can a¤ect the operation of the interbank
market. Moreover, by setting a higher price, i.e. pG > ¸G; the government can pro-
vide subsidies (cheaper loans) to illiquid banks. However, as long as the government
is not able to di¤erentiate the quality of the illiquid banks, there will be only one
bond price, pG, for all illiquid banks. Thus, a better illiquid bank still faces a higher
marginal cost of borrowing than an average bank. Speci…cally, the marginal cost of
borrowing a government bail-out bond for a bank m with a quality of ¸m is
CB =
¸m
¸GpG:
Obviously, CB increases with the quality of the banks, i.e., with ¸m.
It is easy to see that for a given ¸G and CL (marginal cost of liquidating premature
assets), if pG is not high enough there exists a ¸¤ ´ pGCL¸G; such that for ¸m > ¸¤;
CB > CL: That is, none of the banks with ¸m > ¸¤ will accept the government bail-
out bond (at price pG) but will chose to liquidate their premature assets at a marginal
cost CL. However, unlike the case of no government intervention, the liquidation of
premature assets by better banks will not lead to the collapse of the interbank market
as long as the government has enough reserves to support the …xed bond price pG.
We suppose that the government’s objective is to select a bail-out strategy to
halt bank runs with a minimum of social costs. Without knowing each bank’s risk
pro…le, the government should set pG high enough to avoid social costs incurred by
the liquidation of better assets by the better banks. However, this implies that all
the illiquid banks will be bailed out. We call this a bail-out trap.
12The assumption that government is allowed to break even is a benchmark case. It is straightfor-
ward to change this into a case where the government has a …xed buget to bail out the banks.
24Proposition 4 In an economy with single-bank …nancing, if a government has enough
reserves but does not improve the banks’ commitment capacities, the best the govern-
ment can do is to bail out all illiquid banks indiscriminately. This will prevent a bank
run but will also produce a commitment problem in the economy.
A fundamental reason for such a bail-out trap is the commitment problem of banks
in an economy which generates lemon problems in the banking system. The govern-
ment’s soft-budget policy will induce more moral hazard problems for bank managers.
In the end, the economy becomes a victim of the government’s LOLR policy which
induces moral hazard problems and soft budget constraints in the banking sector.
A scheme which induces stronger banks to seek government assistance, while leav-
ing weaker banks to deal with bank runs, requires the government to reverse its bond
payment scheme such that a borrower in a deteriorating state should pay more than
one in a good state. However, such a policy is not feasible as long as a failed bank
has limited liability when it faces a run or goes bankrupt. Perhaps this is why in
reality we never encounter such a government policy to deal with various banking
crises, such as policies related to deposit insurance and the discount window.
The major obstacle which causes the failure of the interbank market and the mal-
function of the LOLR policy is an informational problem. One may wonder whether
the problem can be avoided if the government has a better-designed LOLR policy.
Speci…cally, it may be interesting to examine whether the LOLR policy can be used
as a screening device by the government in an SBC economy to sort out its informa-
tional problem so that solvent illiquid banks can solve their liquidity problems in the
interbank market.
Intuitively, in this scheme, an LOLR policy is divided into two parts: providing
liquidity and screening banks. Here, we focus on screening banks. Instead of targeting
solvent banks, the central bank’s LOLR package targets insolvent banks. The bail-
out scheme is such that the central bank bond is distributed to any bank that asks
for help. The bond is associated with a pro…t tax, in that all the pro…ts of a solvent
25bank will be taken away, thus making such help not worthwhile for a solvent bank.
However, without a pro…t, an insolvent bank does not expect to pay anything to get
help from the central bank. Thus, all the insolvent illiquid banks will ask for help
and all the illiquid banks left in the market will be solvent banks. Although the
above scheme might be ‘optimal’ since only illiquid banks need to be bailed out by
the government, this ‘optimal’ LOLR policy still leads to a bail-out trap.
In the above analysis the government has unlimited resources to bail out all the
troubled banks, thus a bank run can still be averted. If the number of illiquid banks
is large and the government has a binding budget constraint to deal with them, the
government is not able to bail out all of them. Given the lemon problem in the
banking system, the best the government can do is to bail out the banks randomly.
In such a case, contagious risks cannot be eliminated. This is because without
knowing the banks’ quality and which bank will be bailed out by the government,
late consumers face the uncertainty of losing their deposits. In fact, a government
refusal to lend may be interpreted by the market as a bad signal about the bank;
this may explain what occurred to Finance One (a large …nancial institution) in
Thailand. Finance One declared bankrupt in June 1997 after being denied help from
the government, which in turn triggered a bank run contagion before the currency
crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998).13
Thus, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 In an SBC economy, if the government does not have enough capacity
to bail out all the illiquid banks, the best the government can do is to bail out the
banks randomly; as a result, there may be a contagious run on all those banks that do
not receive government assistance.
In contrast, in an HBC economy both the market and the government are aware
of the quality of the illiquid banks. Thus, if there is a need for the government
to intervene, for instance because of unexpected liquidity shocks, the government is
13We thank Charles Goodhart for his suggestions regarding this elaboration and for the example.
26able to bail out only the solvent illiquid banks. Therefore, in addition to the higher
e¢ciency of the government rescue plan, there is less of a burden on the government’s
plan because insolvent banks can be identi…ed and do not need to be bailed out.
Corollary 2 In an HBC economy, if the interbank bond market cannot provide suf-
…cient liquidity to illiquid banks, the government can always bail out only the solvent
banks. Consequently, contagious risks are much smaller than in an SBC economy.
Our theory also has strong policy implications for the central bank’s LOLR policy
and …nancial system reform. With respect to potential moral hazard problems related
to the central bank’s bail-out policy, it is argued that focusing on large banks, i.e.,
the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) doctrine of the LOLR (Goodhart and Huang, 1998) and
a random LOLR policy (Freixas, 1999), may be preferable. Our theory implies that
although a TBTF policy may be optimum when attention is restricted to a short
run LOLR issue, it may not be a good policy for the long run. This is because a
TBTF policy may distort the bank managers’ incentives and thus trigger ine¢cient
bank mergers. When all the banks are large, not only will the TBTF policy not work
properly, but a random operation of the LOLR will not be feasible either, since each
bank is too large to allow it to fail (what occurred in Japan and Korea may shed
some light on this). Even worse, if the number of banks is small in an economy, it
is more likely that an SBC problem will prevail. Then the SBC problem will cause
a lemon problem in the interbank market, and this may lead to a bail-out trap for
the economy. That is, the best that a rational government can do when banks are in
trouble in an SBC economy is to bail out all of them indiscriminately. Therefore, the
optimal LOLR policy should not be isolated from …nancial institution reforms. In the
long run, reforms related to hardening the budget constraints are key to preventing
the central bank’s LOLR policy from degenerating into an SBC engine.
275. OTHER POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1 East Asian “Miracle” vs. East Asian Financial Crisis
Although our model is very stylized, it sheds some new lights on our understand-
ing of …nancial institutions and …nancial crises (e.g., phenomena documented by
Kindleberger, 1996, and Delhasise, 1999), particularly the recent East Asian …nan-
cial crisis.14 The Korean and Taiwan economies are good examples to illustrate that
our theory, which links …nancial crises to …nancial institutions, is relevant.
Korea and Taiwan are at similar development stages, geographically close, and
they also have similar technologies, labor inputs, and high savings (e.g., high shares
of trade in GNP; recent transformations from a traditional economy to one that is
oriented toward high-tech). However, while Korea was at the center of the East Asian
crisis, Taiwan had been much less a¤ected. Our explanation for this di¤erence rests
on the substantially di¤erent …nancial institutions in the two economies.
It is well documented that Korean development has been characterized by the es-
tablishment of large conglomerates (chaebols) through government-coordinated bank
loans. In a typical case, …nancing decisions for projects in Korea are made by the
government or by the principal bank among a group of investing banks.15 Using
14We are fully aware that the East Asian …nancial crisis involved many other issues, such as
exchange rates and international investments, which our model does not discuss. However, we
believe that the level of fragility of the …nancial institutions in those economies created conditions
that determined whether moderate exogenous shocks could trigger a …nancial crisis. Some evidence
shows that it was domestic bank runs in Korea that induced a drastic foreign capital out‡ow – the
crisis phenomenon. If so, then our model may be used directly to explain the crisis. In any event,
our model increases our understanding of the role of the interbank market in …nancial crisis.
15There is a large literature which documents how the Korean government makes major …nancing
decisions across the economy. For example, in the 1970s the Korean government provided subsidized
loans to promote investments in the heavy and chemical industries. In the 1980s, using similar
…nancing approach, the government promoted specialization in the largest chaebols. Related to
the government’s involvement in …nancing decisions, after the mid-1970s the Korean government
introduced a so-called “principal transaction” banking system. Under this system, the bank that
28the language of our model, this institution corresponds to the single-bank …nancing
mode.
It is also well documented that bankruptcies rarely occurred in Korea prior to the
recent …nancial crisis (particularly in the chaebols); and information about investment
quality was often unavailable.16 Our theory says that single-bank …nancing leads to
a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market, which can result in a …nancial crisis
with moderate idiosyncratic shocks.
With respect to the cause of the …nancial crisis, it has been claimed by many
economists, policy makers, and businessmen that the bankruptcy of several insolvent
top chaebols in early 1997 triggered the crisis (e.g., Park, 1997). This observation is
consistent with our prediction if the chaebols are viewed as banks and the investors
(e.g., creditors) are viewed as depositors in our model. In fact, the chaebols are
conglomerates with the functions of …nancial institutions.
In sharp contrast, Taiwan …rms relied on diversi…ed …nancial sources and there were
frequent bankruptcies in the corporate sector. Ine¢cient …rms were bankrupt, and
information about investment quality was available.17 Our theory predicts that in
this economy the interbank market will function well and there should be no …nancial
crisis when there are idiosyncratic shocks (regardless of the strength of the shocks).
Our theory also helps to reconcile the paradox between the East Asian “miracle”
in the three decades prior to the mid-1990s and the East Asian “…nancial crisis” in
1997. In the period of early development, that is, during the catching-up period of the
was most involved …nancially with each chaebol was designated as the principal transaction bank to
coordinate all lending activities. Other banks were supposed to follow the …nancing decisions of the
principal bank.
16From panel data of more than 40,000 Korean manufacturing plants for the 1983 - 93 period, Aw,
Chung, and Roberts (1998) discover that the productivity of plants being closed down was about
the same as that of those remained operating. This suggests that decisions involving the closure of
plants were not related to e¢ciency considerations, i.e., such closures were not bankruptcies in a
usual sense; thus, the observable plant closures did not give much information to investors.
17Using a large panel data set Aw et al. (1998) discover that the productivity of closed-down
(disciplined) …rms in Taiwan was 11.4 percent to 15.5 percent lower than that of other …rms.
291960s to the early 1990s, the projects were more homogeneous in terms of uncertainty
due to the nature of technological imitation. In this case, our theory predicts that
there are no project liquidations and no bank runs in an economy with a pooling
equilibrium; that is, an SBC economy appears even to outperform an HBC economy
and may attract a large number of investments. However, when an economy is on
technological frontiers and attempts major innovations (e.g., South Korea since the
early 1990s), the heterogeneity of the projects rises precipitously and the negative
e¤ects of an SBC economy are dominant, thus incubating trouble in the …nancial
system.
5.2 Transparency and Financial Liberalization
At a more general level, our results are closely related to another important policy
issue: the transparency of the …nancial sector to the market and to the government.
A widely held view emphasizes that policies can improve the transparency of …nancial
institutions. However, the lessons of centralized economies and the long debate over
the viability of centralized economies since the late 1930s (Lange vs. Hayek) both
tell us that it is impossible to have transparency in all aspects of any economy. In
light of such an impossibility, a key issue is which aspects are to be made transparent
and how. Moreover, not only is it impossible to have transparency in all aspects of
an economy, our theory suggests that targeting the wrong aspect of an economy to
improve transparency can make things even worse.
Hayek (1945) outlined a principle according to which it is the market, not the
government, that provides the right information for the economy to run e¢ciently.
But what this means in the context of …nancial crisis is unclear. One of our ma-
jor contributions is that we provide a model to illustrate that an HBC mechanism
makes solvency information transparent to the market and to the government. Thus,
it makes the …nancial market more stable and helps the government to intervene
correctly when necessary.
30Moreover, our theory implies that wrongly targeting transparency can result in
disaster. This is because an HBC mechanism relies on the ‘non-transparency’ of the
co-…nanciers’ information regarding the reorganizing of a bad project. If this condi-
tion is changed but all other conditions remain the same due to a wrong policy, then
the HBC mechanism is destroyed such that all the bad projects will be reorganized
even when they are …nanced jointly.
To summarize, the essential message of our theory regarding this issue is that a
key policy to improve transparency correctly and e¤ectively may not be a policy
which directly targets information, but a policy which hardens budget constraints or
a policy which lowers the institutional costs of multi-…nancier …nancing.
Another important policy issue concerns the liberalization of …nancial institutions.
To analyze this, we can change our model from an M-bank economy to a one-bank
economy. According to our theory, a one-bank economy must be an SBC economy.
Moreover, because all the deposits in the economy are pooled in one bank, there are
no idiosyncratic liquidity shocks or technological shocks. Thus, although ine¢cient,
this one-bank economy is almost immune from bank runs or …nancial crisis if there
is no systemic shock.
Unlike the one-bank economy, an M-bank SBC economy is very sensitive to a bank
run contagion due to the lemon problem in the interbank market. This comparison
has important implications for policies/reforms of the banking system. The basic
message is that the liberalization of …nancial institutions must be contingent on
measures to harden budget constraints. If liberalized banks are operating under an
SBC, a liberalization policy alone may greatly destabilize the …nancial system! This
simple analysis captures some characteristics of the reform/liberalization of banking
systems. For instance, a major reform measure in the transition from a centralized
economy to a market economy is to change the banking system from a one-bank
system (at least conceptually one can regard all state banks as branches of one bank
— the state bank) to a multi-bank system. Many of the banking system liberalization
reforms in East Asia prior to 1997 were carried out in this spirit. According to our
31theory, a banking system reform designed to enhance competition as described above
can induce huge contagious risks to the system if simultaneously the system is not
designed to harden budget constraints.
5.3 Corruption and Financial Crisis
To highlight our points, in our basic model we assume that there is no corruption
in the economy. All the problems are generated from corruption-free and ‘pure’
economic institutions. Now we relax this assumption to look at how corruption
a¤ects …nancial institutions and the likelihood of a …nancial crisis.
There are two aspects of corruption that can be introduced into our model to
generate relevant results. The …rst aspect is that corruption itself can be a mechanism
of an SBC (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993); that is, when it is discovered that a project is a
bad one at date 2, in a corrupted economy …rms and/or …nancial institutions have the
option of bribing the government to bail out the project regardless of pro…tability (the
option will be even stronger if bailing out a project is ex post pro…table). Thus, with
the presence of corruption there will be a more serious SBC syndrome. Moreover,
with serious corruption it may be very di¢cult for a multi-…nancier institution, e.g.,
an equity market, to operate due to the lack of contract enforcement and the lack
of transparency in the market. As a result, HBC mechanisms may be destroyed or
HBC banks may be out-competed by corrupted banks.
If the impact of corruption is restricted to the above aspect, all of our theoretical
results will be qualitatively unchanged. However, there is indeed another aspect of
corruption that can enter into our model; that is, corruption can a¤ect the selection
of projects. It turns out that this aspect will signi…cantly alter our theoretical results
regarding the timing of a …nancial crisis.
To illustrate this, suppose that at date 0 there is asymmetric information such that
entrepreneurs know the distribution of the projects better than the banks; moreover,
some risky projects may be bene…cial to some entrepreneurs. In a corrupted economy
32an entrepreneur may bribe the bank so that the project will be …nanced. In that case,
the selected projects will be more heterogeneous than the corruption-free projects.
Thus, many high-risk projects may be selected even in a less developed economy.
When corruption not only results in more serious SBC problems but also results in
the selection of more risky projects, then our theory predicts that the economy will be
more likely to encounter a …nancial crisis than a corruption-free economy regardless
of the stage of development. This may help explaining the …nancial crisis in some
economies where corruption is regarded as a serious problem, such as the Philippines
and Thailand etc.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper endogenizes contagious risks and …nancial crises from …nancial insti-
tutions. We begin our analysis by deriving a pooling equilibrium in the interbank
market from single-bank …nancing and a separating equilibrium in the interbank
market from multi-bank …nancing. Then we show how a pooling equilibrium in the
interbank market generates a “lemon” problem. The lemon problem in the interbank
market makes the costs of borrowing high for strong banks when they face liquidity
shocks. This leads them to leave the interbank market and to rely on liquidating
premature assets to solve their problems. However, with their withdrawals from the
interbank market the quality of the market will deteriorate, further exacerbating the
lemon problem, and leading more good banks to withdraw from the interbank market
– further worsening the quality of the market. This process can lead to a collapse
of the entire interbank market. In contrast, …nancial institutions involving in joint
…nancing generate a separating equilibrium in which information about the quality of
the banks is disclosed to the entire banking system in a timely manner. This allows
the interbank market to function e¤ectively in providing loans to illiquid but solvent
banks. Thus, solvent banks will be rescued and …nancial crisis avoided.
Our model extends Diamond-Dybvig’s seminal insight regarding a run on a single
33bank to a contagious banking crisis in the banking system of multi-banks. To our
knowledge, our paper is the …rst to model a contagious banking crisis mechanism
through an interbank market failure caused by endogenized informational problems.
The presence of insolvent banks, as well as an informational problem in the banking
system, pose a great challenge to the government’s lender-of-last-resort policy. From
our theory, we derive that the best a government can do to prevent a …nancial crisis
in an economy with a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market is to bail out
all illiquid banks. However, this will lead the economy to a bail-out trap. Another
important policy implication from our theory for …nancial system reform and for
a …nancial-crisis-prevention policy concerns the transparency of the banking system.
However, transparency cannot be achieved by imposing government regulations alone;
instead, it can only be achieved by reforming the …nancial institutions to harden
budget constraints at the micro level.
The recent Asian …nancial crisis, in particular the sharp comparison between Tai-
wan and Korea, provides evidence consistent with our theory on the importance of
…nancial institutions in generating or containing …nancial crisis. Moreover, our the-
ory helps to reconcile the ostensible paradox between the East Asian “miracle” in the
three decades prior to 1997 and the East Asian “…nancial crisis” in the period after
1997. Our theory provides a formal explanation for the observations and insights of
the East Asian …nancial crisis as runs to the economies, like bank runs, made by
Radelet and Sachs (1998). Chang and Velasco (1998b) also treat the East Asian
…nancial crisis as runs to the economies and they focus on systemic shocks in an
open economy model with one bank. In contrast we focus on institutional conditions
leading to these kinds of runs when there are only idiosyncratic shocks. It turns out
that some of the conditions are related to a banking moral hazard problem, which
is consistent with Krugman’s (1998) intuition regarding the Asian crisis. However,
we also show that a banking moral hazard problem alone does not create a …nancial
crisis.
Our model deals with …nancial crisis in a closed economy. By incorporating ex-
34change regimes, Chang and Velasco (1998a) examine an open economy with the
banking sector which is also based on the Diamond and Dybvig framework. They
show that some random systemic exogenous shocks can cause a …nancial crisis. We
regard that model as complementary to ours. We hope to extend our model to an
open economy in our future research.
35Proof of Lemma 2: A bank’s non-negative expected return condition is
E (R) = (1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ I1 ¡ I2 ¡ I3 ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]C¤
2 ¡
¸m
¸
nC¤
1
pS ¸ 0:
Thus the lower bound of the bond price is,
p = ¸mnC¤
1=
©
¸[(1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ I1 ¡ I2 ¡ I3 ¡ ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n)C¤
2]
ª
:
Given that all the returns of a bank will be distributed to its late consumers, that is,
(1 ¡ ¸)X + ¸Y ¡ I1 ¡ I2 ¡ I3 = (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤
2;
we have,
p = ¸mnC¤
1=
©
¸[(1 ¡ ¸m)X +¸mY ¡ I1 ¡ I2 ¡ I3 ¡ ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n)C¤
2]
ª
= ¸mnC¤
1=
©
¸[(¸m ¡ ¸)(Y ¡ X) + nC¤
2]
ª
:
Using the following relationships,
C¤
1 > 1;C¤
2 < 1 + RS (¸), and RS(¸) =
¸Y + (1 ¡ ¸)X
I1 + I2 + I3
¡ 1;
we have
p =
¸mC¤
1
¹ ¸
n
nC¤
2 + (¸m ¡ ¸)(Y ¡ X)
¸
¸m
¹ ¸
n(I1 + I2 + I3)
n(¸Y + (1 ¡¸)X) + (¸m ¡ ¸)(Y ¡ X)
¼
¸m (I1 + I2 + I3)
¹ ¸(¸Y +(1 ¡ ¸)X)
:
Only when p · ¹ ¸ = pS the illiquid bank will have a non-negative expected pro…t
after borrowing. This will be satis…ed if
¹ ¸
2 ¸
n¸m (I1 +I2 + I3)
n(¸Y + (1 ¡ ¸)X) + (¸m ¡ ¸)(Y ¡ X)
¼
¸m (I1 + I2 + I3)
¸Y + (1 ¡ ¸)X
:
36Proof of Lemma 3: With ¸m = ¸m¡1 +¹ and ¸ = ¸1, we have
¸m = ¸ + (m ¡ 1)¹;
P¹ m
m=1 ¸m = ¸¹ m + 1
2¹(¹ m ¡ 1) ¹ m;
¹ ¸¹ m = 1
¹ m
P¹ m
m=1¸m = ¸ + 1
2¹(¹ m ¡ 1):
Thus,
¸¹ m
¹ ¸
2
¹ m
¡
¸¹ m¡1
¹ ¸
2
¹ m¡1
=
¸ + (¹ m ¡ 1)¹
£
¸ + 1
2¹(¹ m ¡ 1)
¤2 ¡
¸ + (¹ m ¡ 2)¹
£
¸ + 1
2¹(¹ m ¡ 2)
¤2
= ¡
(2¹ m ¡ 3)¸¹2 + (¹ m ¡ 2)(¹ m ¡ 1)¹3
(2¸ + ¹¹ m ¡ ¹)
2 (2¸ +¹¹ m ¡ 2¹)
2
< 0;
for any ¹ m ¸ 2; and ¹ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5: First, let us look at the case where j = k¸. When n · n¤
the zero expected return condition, i.e.,
k¸Y ¡ 2n¤C¤
1
µ
1
p¤ ¡
C¤
2
C¤
1
¶
= k(I1 + ¸(I2 + I3))
will hold, where
n¤ = N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1)
¸Y ¡ I1 ¡ ¸(I2 + I3)
¸Y C¤
1 ¡ C¤
2 (I1 + ¸(I2 + I3))
:
Moreover, given
¸Y ¡I1¡¸(I2+I3)
¸Y C¤
1¡C¤
2(I1+¸(I2+I3)) ¸
(1¡¼1)
(1¡¼1C¤
1); which implies that
N(1¡¼1C¤
1)[¸Y ¡I1¡¸(I2+I3)]
¸Y C¤
1¡C¤
2(I1+¸(I2+I3)) ¸
N(1 ¡ ¼1), we have
n¤ ¸ N(1 ¡ ¼1):
Therefore, the bank is solvent for any n · N:
Then, let us look at the case where n = 0. If j ¸ j¤ then the zero expected return
condition, i.e.,
(j¤ (Y ª ¡ b) + k¸b) = ª;
will hold, where
j¤ = ª
µ
1 ¡ ¸22N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1)
Y (I2 + I3)
(I1 +¸(I2 +I3))
2
¶
;
37and ª =
I1+¸(I2+I3)
¸Y . However, j¤ · 0 given ¸22N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1) ¸ 1: Thus, for any
j ¸ 0 the bank is solvent.
Proof of Lemma 6: Under the condition that there is no good project, j = 0,
but some excessive early withdrawals, n > 0; the expected rate of return is
RH
1 (j = 0) =
1
k[I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)]
µ
1
p¤k¸(I2 + I3) ¡ 2nC¤
1
µ
1
p¤ ¡
C¤
2
C¤
1
¶¶
¡ 1:
It is easy to see that the critical value of n¤ which makes RH
1 (j = 0) = 0 is,
n¤ =
1
2
k
¸(1 ¡ p¤)(I2 + I3) ¡ p¤I
C¤
1 ¡ C¤
2p¤ ;
where, C¤
1 ¡C¤
2p¤ > 0 since C¤
2=C¤
1 < 1=p¤: Since n¤ increases in ¸; the highest n¤
max
is the one at ¸ = 1: By substituting p¤ and k; we have
n¤
max =
I
¡
Y (I2 + I3) ¡ I2¢
2(Y C¤
1 ¡ C¤
2I)
:
Thus, for ¸ · 1, when n ¸ n¤
max the expected rate of return is negative.
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